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The Final Word : June 2003 - Threats to Business Continuity : a living case study

By Michael Vincent

26 December, 2006

In the last few days we have had many scares in the airline industry from the security breaches in Sydney to the violence on the way to Tasmania.  What will be the outcomes of any investigation, will there be a cover up to ensure public confidence or will hard decisions be made?

 

One of the barriers to any outcome is the budget or funds available; this has been a constant mantra of the federal government even though we have a budget surplus, a tax cut and more to the point the Ansett levy is still being charged on all airline tickets issued.  We can no longer accept these inept excuses as being reasons for non-performance in the air safety arena.

 

Several days ago I was in Canberra, coincidently I was delayed because of the security breach in Sydney, I met an old friend in the airport and we discussed the issue of airport safety.  The conclusion reached was that it is impossible to have an absolutely safe system within the constraints of today's world.  This it is the traditional risk and return scenario based on physical factors; we simply cannot over-regulate this area without impacting on the sustainability of the industry.

 

During the conversation I suggested my solution for the issue of safety within our airports, it is based on a basic principle of risk management - risk must be managed at the point where it occurs.  In Australian airports where security exists, all security checks are done just past the check-in counter, people then are allowed to have access to the inner or departure area of the airport.  This was probably OK in the old days when airports where merely transfer lounges and relatively boring.  Now they are merging into shopping centres and entertainment areas and old habits and procedures must be cast aside.  The Herald-Sun of Saturday 31 May listed some items for sale within airports in this country

 

If we look at world's best practice in security Singapore stands out from the rest, quite simple because it adheres to the above principle of risk management.  In other words you can gain access to the "shopping centre" without a security check but cannot gain entry to the departure gate until you have passed through individual gate security.  All departure gates are glassed off and separated from the airport at large.

 

The risks faced in the configuration we have today and managed by the separation of the greater airport from the departure gates are:

 

1. Purchases of dangerous items from shops within the airport.2. Stealing of cutlery from restaurants beyond the security screens.3. In extreme cases being passed items by airport staff who may be "sleepers".4. Obtaining items previously planted or hidden by contacts.

 

I can hear the screams now:

 

1. It will cost too much.2. It will require too many staff.3. It cannot be done.

 

QUITE SIMPLY THESE EXCUSES ARE NO LONGER ACCEPTABLE TO THE TRAVELLING PUBLIC AND INDEED THE INDUSTRY, WHO'S SURVIVAL MAY DEPEND ON THESE MEASURES FOR CONFIDENCE.

 

We can manage it, we need to publicly commit the money now and potentially have it paid back over a period of time by way of a continuation of the Ansett levy, this levy has served it purpose but continues to be charged.  We need to redesign our airports to move security from the front to the departure gate, this needs to be done by prioritising the airports and by setting a timeline for completion.  International terminals before domestic would be the minimum but there is no reason why separate contractors in each state could not do the work now, money is the only issue.  How much is the government prepared to save by trading off a life?  This activity needs to be concurrent with a full review of airport layout and the changing community expectations of the activities of an airport.

 

What about equipment and staffing?  Equipment needs to be ordered, there will be a time delay from order to delivery, this delay can in fact be the building time for terminal re-arrangement.  Staffing, yes we will require more staff but not that many more because not all gates need to be manned at all times, they only need to be manned 20 minutes before a flight departs as the gates would be closed before this, thus denying entry to people without clearance.

 

We have in the last week moved beyond inertia and talk in the airline business in this country it is time to act.

About the Authors

Director

Australasian Risk Management Unit

Faculty of Business and Economics

Monash University

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